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PREVENTING ATOMS FOR PEACE FROM
BECOMING ATOMS OF TERROR: THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT IS NOT A VEHICLE
FOR ADDRESSING TERRORISM
David D. Leege+
“Tuesday, September 11, 2001, dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in
the eastern United States. Millions of men and women readied themselves for
work.”1 By 10:30 a.m. eastern time, the United States had suffered the worst
terrorist attack to occur on American soil.2 The nation’s sense of security and
self-confidence had been severely shaken.3 Ten years later, it is evident that
the attacks of September 11th have forever changed how Americans perceive
and react to threats.4
The ramifications of the September 11th terrorist attacks have been
far-reaching and have resulted in heightened airline security regulations,5
buffer zones around federal buildings,6 and a persistent public fear that
manifests itself in response to previously mundane events, such as a plane
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1. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 1 (2004). The beginning of the nuclear power program in the United
States was marked by President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” address to the
United Nations, in which he promised that the United States would “‘find the way by which the
miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.’”
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING HANDBOOK at ix (Kenneth D. Kok ed., 2009).
2. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at
311.
3. R.W. Apple, Jr., Awaiting the Aftershocks: Washington and Nation Plunge Into Fight
With Enemy Hard to Identify and Punish, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A1.
4. See id.; see also A. G. Sulzberger & Matthew L. Wald, White House Apologizes for Air
Force Flyover, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM BLOG (Apr. 27, 2009, 10:36 AM), http://cityroom.blogs
.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/air-force-one-backup-rattles-new-york-nerve (describing the public’s
reaction to an unannounced flyover of New York, which incited spontaneous reactions and fear of
an attack).
5. See Eben Kaplan, Targets for Terrorists: Post-9/11 Aviation Security, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.cfr.org/publication/11397/targets_for_terrorists
.html.
6. See SHAWN REESE & LORRAINE H. TONG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41138, FEDERAL
BUILDING AND FACILITY SECURITY 3 (2010).
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flying over downtown Manhattan.7 Elevated security concerns have affected
commercial nuclear facilities as well.8 The United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC or the Commission)9 has taken steps to increase nuclear
security.10 However, citizens’ groups and local governments have called for
greater action.11 Particularly, these groups have advocated for the inclusion of
terrorists’ acts in the environmental-impact analysis conducted when the NRC
issues a new license for a facility.12 This Comment addresses whether the law
necessitates consideration of the impact of a potential terrorist attack on a
nuclear facility in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
In December 2001, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) applied for a license
from the NRC to operate an independent spent-fuel storage installation at
PG&E’s Diablo Canyon Power Plant in San Luis Obispo, California.13 The
7. See Sulzberger & Wald, supra note 4.
8. E.g., Consideration of Aircraft Impact for New Nuclear Power Reactors, 74 Fed. Reg.
28,112, 28,112–13 (June 12, 2009) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 50 & 52) (requiring nuclear
facilities to incorporate the capability to withstand impact from aircraft into their design).
9. The NRC is responsible for the licensing of commercial nuclear reactors and associated
facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 5842 (2006). The federal government is responsible for providing for the
disposal of spent nuclear fuel. See id. § 10131(a)(4). Until the federal government takes
responsibility for this fuel, utilities must provide interim storage through one of two methods:
spent-fuel pools or dry-cask storage. Id. § 10131(a)(5); Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, U.S.
NRC, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage.html (last updated Sept. 16, 2011). An
independent spent-fuel-storage installation is a facility that may be located on a reactor site or on
a separate site for storage of spent nuclear fuel. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations
(ISFSI), U.S. NRC, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/independent-spent-fuelstorage-installation-isfsi.html (last updated Oct. 6, 2011).
The two independent
spent-fuel-storage installations discussed in this Comment utilize the dry-storage method. See
Spent Fuel—What Is It and How Will It be Stored, PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE, LLC,
http://www.privatefuelstorage.com/project/howitworks.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011); see also
San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 2006). The spent fuel
is placed into a stainless-steel canister that is welded shut. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1021.
The canister is then placed into a concrete storage overpack, which utilizes passive air cooling
through the circulation of air. Id. The overpack is then placed on concrete pads for interim
storage. Id.
10. See BACKGROUNDER: NUCLEAR SECURITY, U.S. NRC 1, 3 (2008), available at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/security-enhancements.pdf.
11. See, e.g., EDWARD S. LYMAN, CHERNOBYL ON THE HUDSON? THE HEALTH AND
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF A TERRORIST ATTACK ON THE INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR PLANT, UNION
OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 8 (2004).
12. See infra Part I.E (discussing attempts to require the NRC to include a terrorist-attack
analysis in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)). The NRC’s issuance of a license is
considered a “major Federal action[]” under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). The NRC is required to assess
the possible environmental impact and issue an EIS. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (requiring all
federal government agencies to prepare an EIS along with all “major Federal actions”); 10 C.F.R.
§ 51.20 (2010) (setting forth instances when an EIS is required, including with the issuance of
licenses).
13. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1021.
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NRC’s Environmental Assessment (EA)14 set forth a “finding of no significant
environmental impact” (FONSI).15 Notably, the EA did not consider a
possible terrorist attack.16 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, the Sierra Club,
and an individual citizen appealed the final order of the NRC, alleging that the
NRC violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to
include an evaluation of the environmental effects of a terrorist attack in the
EA.17 The Ninth Circuit agreed and held that the NRC should have included
terrorist attacks as part of its NEPA review.18
In July 2005, AmerGen Energy Company, L.L.C. (AmerGen) sought to
renew its operating license for the Oyster Creek Generating Station in Ocean
County, New Jersey.19 Again, the NRC did not address acts of terrorism in the
EIS for AmerGen’s license application, and the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection appealed the NRC’s decision to the Third Circuit.20
The Third Circuit, disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s San Luis Obispo
ruling,21 held that the NRC did not have to consider acts of terrorism in their
NEPA analysis22—creating a circuit split. This split is likely to expand as a
result of a challenge brought to a recent NRC licensing decision in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.23
14. See infra note 40.
15. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1024.
16. See id. (noting that although “[t]he EA is not devoid of discussion of terrorist attacks,”
the NRC had determined that an EA was “not the appropriate forum for the consideration of
[such] acts”).
17. Id. at 1021–22, 1024.
18. Id. at 1035.
19. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2009). The Oyster Creek
Generating Station consists of a boiling-water nuclear reactor used for commercial generation of
electricity. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMM’N, GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR LICENSE RENEWAL OF NUCLEAR
PLANTS: REGARDING OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION—FINAL REPORT
(NUREG-1437, SUPPLEMENT 1) § 2.0 (2007).
20. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 135.
21. Id. at 142 (“[W]e disagree with the [Ninth Circuit’s] rejection of the ‘reasonably close
causal relationship’ test set forth by the Supreme Court and hold that this standard remains the
law in this Circuit.”).
22. Id. at 143.
23. Petition for Judicial Review of NRC Memorandum and Order CLI-12-02, Blue Ridge
Envtl. Def. League v. NRC, 668 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 12-1105). On February 9, 2012,
the Commission issued an order authorizing the construction and operation of two new reactors in
Georgia. Memorandum and Order at 85, In re Southern Nuclear Operating Co., CLI-12-02 (NRC
Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/orders
/2012/2012-02cli.pdf (“The Director of the Office of New Reactors therefore is authorized to
issue the limited work authorizations and appropriate licenses authorizing construction and
operation of Vogtle, Units 3 and 4.”). In less than ten days, several environmental groups filed a
challenge to the NRC order alleging that the EIS was insufficient. Petition for Judicial Review of
NRC Memorandum and Order CLI-12-02, supra, at 2 (“Petitioners contend that in authorizing
issuance of the [order], the NRC . . . violated the National Environmental Policy Act, . . . [and]
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Part I of this Comment provides a background of the NRC’s responsibilities
under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA),24 reviews both the NEPA process and
key judicial decisions interpreting the Act and related regulations, and
discusses the decisions of the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts. Part II analyzes
the arguments for and against evaluating acts of terrorism as part of the NEPA
Process. Part III argues that, although government agencies should confront
the possibility of terrorist attacks directly, the NEPA process is not the right
vehicle to address terrorism, and, in the absence of resolution by the Supreme
Court, the circuit split should be resolved through agency rulemaking or
legislative action.
I. START-UP SOURCES25
A. The Atomic Energy Act
In the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,26 Congress created the NRC and
transferred to it regulatory responsibilities previously held by the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC).27 The present form of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (AEA) outlines these regulatory responsibilities,28 and provides that any
the Council on Environmental Quality’s regulations.”). Because the NRC’s final EIS did not
include acts of terrorism, such as an aircraft attack, the petitioners are likely to raise this omission
as part of the challenge. See OFFICE NEW REACTORS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, FINAL
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR COMBINED LICENSES (COLS) FOR
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNITS 3 AND 4—FINAL REPORT (1 NUREG-1947), at E86 (2011).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297g (2006).
25. To start up a reactor safely, it is necessary to monitor the number of neutrons in the core.
When new fuel is used in a reactor, there may be an insufficient number of neutrons for the
neutron detectors to work properly. Therefore, a start-up source is used to increase the number of
neutrons needed for the detectors to work properly. See NUCLEAR ENGINEERING HANDBOOK,
supra note 1, at 27.
26. Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5891
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5841(a), 5841(f)–(g). The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 established the
AEC. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 2, 60 Stat. 755, 756 (amended 1954). This Act
transferred control of the nation’s nuclear program from the U.S. Army’s Manhattan Engineer
District (Manhattan Project) and placed it under civilian control. F.G. GOSLING, U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, THE MANHATTAN PROJECT: MAKING THE ATOMIC BOMB 99, 102 (2005). Later,
Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which overhauled the 1946 Act and expanded
the authority of the AEC to include civilian uses of atomic energy. Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 25, 68 Stat. 919, 925; see also Our History, U.S. NRC,
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/history.html (last updated May 11, 2011). Eventually, the AEC’s
regulatory programs came under attack, prompting Congress to split the promotional and
regulatory functions of the AEC in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974 § 2(c); see also Our History, supra. Congress delegated the
regulatory functions to the NRC and the promotional functions to the Energy Research and
Development Administration (now the Department of Energy). 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801(b)–(c),
5841(f)–(g).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297g-4.
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commercial possession or use of special nuclear material29 requires a license
issued by the NRC.30 The NRC is charged with ensuring that licenses are
granted only when “utilization or production of special nuclear material will be
in accord with the common defense and security and will provide adequate
protection to the health and safety of the public.”31 Accordingly, the
Commission must refuse to issue a license if it determines that issuing a license
to the applicant “would be inimical to the common defense and security or to
the health and safety of the public.”32 The “adequate protection” standard does
not require absolute protection—some level of risk is acceptable.33 In addition
to issuing licenses for nuclear materials, the NRC performs its resulting
The incidents at
functions through rulemaking and adjudication.34
Chernobyl,35 Three Mile Island,36 and, most recently, the nuclear incident at
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan demonstrate that nuclear
power is an unforgiving technology, which makes the NRC’s role in regulating
nuclear materials all the more important.37

29. See id. § 2131.
The term “special nuclear material” means (1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the
isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the Commission,
pursuant to the provisions of [42 U.S.C. § 2071 (2006)] determines to be special
nuclear material, but does not include source material; or (2) any material artificially
enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not include source material.
Id. § 2014(aa).
30. Similarly, the NRC also regulates source and byproduct material. Id. §§ 2093(a),
2111(a). Source material is material containing uranium or thorium. Id. § 2014(z). Byproduct
material includes material that results from preparing or using special nuclear material. Id.
§ 2014(e).
31. Id. § 2232(a) (emphasis added). Courts have interpreted “common defense and
security” to include safeguarding nuclear material, protecting restricted data, and maintaining
special nuclear material for national defense. See Siegel v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778, 781 (D.C. Cir.
1968). Additionally, courts have interpreted the public-health-and-safety standard to ensure that
the applicant is qualified and the design of the facility “protect[s] plant employees and the public
against accidents and their consequences.” Id. at 781–82 (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d).
33. Pub. Citizen v. NRC, 573 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Union of Concerned
Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 114, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). “Adequate protection” is the
minimum standard required by statute. See Union of Concerned Scientists, 824 F.2d at 118.
Congress has granted the NRC discretion to impose additional requirements on licensees in order
“to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property.” 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (describing these grants of authority).
35. In 1986, Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station was “the site of the world’s worst civilian
nuclear power accident.” HELMUT HIRSCH ET AL., NUCLEAR REACTOR HAZARDS: ONGOING
DANGERS OF OPERATING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 7 (2005), available at
http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/th/pageFiles/106897/nuclearreactorhazards.pdf.
36. See infra Part I.C.1.
37. In March 2011, an earthquake and subsequent tsunami caused the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant to shut down and lose cooling capability, damaging the nuclear fuel. See
CHARLES MILLER ET AL., U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
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B. The National Environmental Policy Act
In 1969, Congress established a national environmental policy through the
enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).38 Most notably,
NEPA requires all federal agencies, when proposing a major federal action
that significantly affects the environment, to provide a detailed EIS in
connection with that proposal.39

ENHANCING REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 9 (2011), available at
http://pbadpws.nrc.gov/docs/ML/111861807.pdf.
38. National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)) (setting forth the Act’s purpose
“[t]o declare national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between
man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; [and] to enrich the
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation”).
The statute provides six goals for the federal government to adhere to in formulating
environmental policy:
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally
pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation,
risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage,
and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety
of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high
standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable
recycling of depletable resources.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (emphasis added). The detailed statement must include:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id. NEPA also established the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)—an executive branch
agency that issues rules to implement the requirement that agencies prepare EISs. Id. §§ 4342,
4344; e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1–1508.28 (2009). However, if an agency determines that EIS is
not required, the agency may instead prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA)—a more
concise document containing a brief analysis determining either that an EIS should be prepared,
or that there is no significant environmental impact. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4, 1508.9. The EA
analysis is used to “[b]riefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to
prepare an [EIS].” Id. § 1508.9. For a finding of no significant impact, the agency will report the
EA (or a summary of it) and briefly state the reasons why the agency action will not have a
significant effect on the environment. Id. § 1508.13. In this Comment, the process of preparing
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In Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, the
Supreme Court identified the “twin aims” of NEPA: “The first is to inject
environmental considerations into the federal agency’s decisionmaking process
by requiring the agency to prepare an EIS. The second aim is to inform the
public that the agency has considered environmental concerns in its
decisionmaking process.”40 The public disclosure of EISs falls within the
purview of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which contains an
exception that restricts the disclosure of classified information.41 Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court held that an agency otherwise required to prepare an EIS
for consideration in its decision making (the first of NEPA’s twin aims), must
do so even if the EIS cannot be released to the public (the second of the twin
aims).42
C. Supreme Court Decisions Interpreting “Reasonably Foreseeable” Impacts
1. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy
Metropolitan Edison Co. owned two nuclear power plants on Three Mile
Island (TMI) near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.43 On March 28, 1979, while
TMI-1 was shut down for refueling, a severe accident damaged the reactor of
TMI-2.44 In response to the accident, the NRC ordered that TMI-1, which
shared a similar design to TMI-2, remain inoperative until the NRC could
determine whether the reactor could operate safely without placing the public

an EA followed by an EIS if necessary will be referred to as the “NEPA process” or “NEPA
analysis.”
In 1983, the Supreme Court clarified that NEPA does not require “agencies to elevate
environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations. . . . Rather, it require[s] only that
the agency take a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences before taking a major action.”
Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., v. NRDC, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (citations omitted). Additionally,
NEPA does not specify agency adherence to a particular decision-making structure. Id. at 100.
40. 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981). In Weinberger, the Navy prepared an EA as part of the
decision-making process to build a new weapons-storage facility on the island of Oahu, Hawaii.
Id. at 141. This facility was capable of storing nuclear weapons, but, for national security
reasons, whether nuclear weapons are actually stored at the location is classified national-security
information. Id. Finding no significant environmental impact, the Navy did not prepare an EIS.
Id. The respondents brought a suit to enjoin the Navy from constructing the facility on the basis
that the EA did not adequately address the enhanced risk of a nuclear accident. Id. at 142.
41. See id. at 143; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2006) (exempting from public release
“matters that are . . . (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly
classified pursuant to such Executive order”).
42. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 146. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harry Blackmun noted
that “[i]f nonclassified data is segregable and properly disclosable . . . it must be released to the
public.” Id. at 147 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
43. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 768 (1983). The
two nuclear power plants operating at TMI are known as TMI-1 and TMI-2. Id.
44. Id. at 768.
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at risk.45 To make that determination, the NRC noticed a hearing and invited
briefing on several issues, including whether to consider psychological harm
and other indirect effects of a restart.46 People Against Nuclear Energy
(PANE) responded with a brief arguing that a restart of TMI-1 “would cause
both severe psychological heath damage to person living in the vicinity[] and
serious damage to the stability, cohesiveness, and well-being of the
neighboring communities.”47 After the NRC disagreed, PANE petitioned the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for review of the NRC’s actions,
contending that NEPA required the NRC to analyze such an effect.48 The D.C.
Circuit agreed with PANE, and held that NEPA required the NRC to consider
psychological harm and other effects on the well-being of the community.49
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and analyzed the issue by interpreting
NEPA’s language in the context of its legislative history.50 The Court
determined that Congress had designed NEPA to promote human welfare by
forcing federal agencies to consider only the effects of their actions on the
physical environment, rather than every effect of the proposed action.51 The
Court further explained that NEPA requires more than actual or “but for”
causation for the effect to be considered an environmental effect of an agency’s
action;52 rather, the Court held that “the terms ‘environmental effect’ and
‘environmental impact’ in [NEPA should] be read to include a requirement of
a reasonably close causal relationship between a change in the physical
environment and the effect at issue. This requirement is like the familiar
doctrine of proximate cause from tort law.”53 Therefore, an effect—although
actually caused by a physical change in the environment—will not be
45. Id. at 769 (citing Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.
1) Order, 44 Fed. Reg. 40,461, 40,461 (July 10, 1979)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 769. PANE was a collation of local residents who opposed the restart of TMI-1.
Id.
48. Id. at 769.
49. Id. at 771.
50. Id. at 772.
51. Id. The Court noted that the statute centers on the adjective “environmental.” Id. To
interpret Congress’s intended meaning of “environmental,” the Court examined the statements of
two principal sponsors of NEPA. Id. at 772–73. In support of his bill, Senator Henry Jackson
stated that NEPA is a “congressional declaration that . . . as a government or as a people . . . we
will not intentionally initiate actions which [will] do irreparable damage to the air, land and
water which support life on earth.” Id. at 773 (quoting 115 CONG. REC. 40,416 (1969) (statement
of Sen. Henry Jackson) (emphasis added by Court)). Representative John Dingell, echoing this
intent, stated that “[w]e can now move forward to preserve and enhance our air, aquatic, and
terrestrial environments.” Id. (quoting 115 CONG. REC. 40,924 (1969) (statement of Rep. John
Dingell) (emphasis added by Court)). The Court concluded that Congress chose to promote the
goals of human health and welfare by pursuing protection of the physical environment as the
means for achieving these goals. Id.
52. Id. at 772, 774.
53. Id. (emphasis added).

2012]

Terrorism and the National Environmental Policy Act

535

considered under NEPA if the effect is too far attenuated from an agency’s
action.54
Applying this reasonably close causal-relationship test, the Court examined
the chain of causation that would lead to the psychological-health effects
alleged by PANE.55 The causal chain began with the Agency’s proposed
action to authorize renewed operation of TMI-1, which would cause change to
the physical environment.56 This change would create the risk of another
accident.57 The perception of this risk by members of PANE and the
community would then cause the psychological health damage at issue.58 The
Court concluded that the risk of an accident alone as an unrealized event was
not itself an effect on the physical environment.59 Therefore, the psychological
impact on humans based on the fear created by the risk was too far attenuated
from the Agency’s action to demonstrate the necessary reasonably close causal
relationship contemplated under NEPA.60
The Court admonished courts and agencies to draw a manageable line when
defining a reasonably close causal relationship in light of time and resource
constraints.61 Otherwise, the Court warned, limited agency resources may be
spread so thin that the requirements would undermine NEPA’s purpose of
insuring “a fully informed and well-considered decision,”62 and, consequently,
agencies would be unable to protect the environment adequately.63
2. Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen
In 2001, President George W. Bush pledged to lift a long-standing
moratorium on qualified Mexican motor carriers in accordance with U.S.
obligations under the North American Free Trade Agreement.64 To do so, the
54. Id. For example, the Court considered whether out-of-town relatives of local residents
may claim to suffer psychological health problems as a result of the renewed operation of TMI-1.
Id. (“However, this harm is simply too remote from the physical environment to justify requiring
the NRC to evaluate the psychological health damage to these people that may be caused by
renewed operation of TMI-1.”).
55. Id. at 775–76.
56. Id. at 775.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 776.
62. Id. (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).
In this case, for example, requiring the NRC to consider the psychological impacts of its decisions
would compel the agency to devote significant resources to the development of psychological
expertise, thereby reducing the resources available for evaluating physical effects on the
environment. Id.
63. Id.
64. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 762 (2004). Before 1982, Mexican
motor carriers could obtain a certificate to operate within the United States. Id. at 759. However,
concern with discriminatory treatment of U.S. motor carriers operating in Canada and Mexico
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Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) issued interim rules on
March 19, 2002 that provided safety requirements for licensing Mexican trucks
to operate in the United States.65 As required by NEPA, the FMCSA
performed an EA of the safety-monitoring rules and found no significant
impact to the environment.66 Various individuals and groups challenged the
FMCSA’s rules on the grounds that FMCSA violated NEPA in reaching a
finding of no significant impact.67 These groups alleged—and the Ninth
Circuit agreed—that FMCSA was required to conduct an EIS.68
Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and held that FMCSA had not
violated NEPA by issuing the rules without considering the impact of
increased volume of Mexican motor carriers on the environment.69 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court applied the reasonably close causal-relationship test
articulated in Metropolitan Edison Co.70 Concurrently, the Court included a
“rule of reason” in its analysis,71 finding that “[w]here the preparation of an
EIS would serve ‘no purpose’ in light of NEPA’s regulatory scheme as a
whole, no rule of reason worthy of that title would require an agency to prepare
an EIS.”72 The respondents argued that although FMCSA had no control over
the decision to lift the moratorium, the agency’s action should still be
considered a cause of the increased volume because “but for” the new rules,
the increase could not occur.73 However, the Court determined that because
FMCSA had no authority to prevent Mexican motor carriers from entering the
country, evaluating the environmental impact of their entry would have no

prompted Congress to enact a two-year moratorium on new certifications and to authorize the
President to extend the moratorium to serve the national interest. Id. As part of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, the United States agreed to phase out the moratorium in 1992,
but progress stalled due to concern with Mexico’s safety regulations. Id. at 759–60. In early
2001, following an adverse international arbitration panel ruling, President Bush announced his
intention to lift the moratorium “following the preparation of new regulations governing grants of
operating authority to Mexican motor carriers.” Id. at 760.
65. See id. at 762.
66. Id. at 761–62. The EA assumed that there would be no significant change in
U.S.-Mexico trade volume as a result of the new safety regulations. Id. at 761. Rather, the
FMCSA determined that any increase in trade volume would be a result of the President’s action
in lifting the ban, and not an “effect” of the rule. Id. For this reason, FMCSA did not consider
any potential environmental impact from an increased volume of Mexican motor carriers in the
United States. Id.
67. Id. at 762.
68. Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1009, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 541
U.S. 752 (2004).
69. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 773.
70. Id. at 767 (citing Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766,
774 (1983)).
71. Id.
72. Id. A “rule of reason” allows agencies to determine whether an EIS is required based on
“the usefulness of any new potential information to the decision-making process.” Id.
73. Id.
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effect on any action taken by FMCSA.74 Therefore, the Court concluded that
an evaluation of the motor carriers’ entry failed the reasonably close
causal-relationship test because the rules issued by FMCSA were not the
legally relevant cause of the impact of the entry.75
3. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council
In Methow Valley, the Supreme Court affirmed the regulations of the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) that concerned properly prepared
EISs and did not require agencies to analyze worst-case scenarios in a
particular action.76 The Court agreed that agencies should evaluate only those
impacts that are reasonably foreseeable without concern for “highly
speculative harms.”77
D. The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of the Reasonably Foreseeable Standard
Before San Louis Obispo
Before the Supreme Court’s holding in Methow Valley, the Ninth Circuit
interpreted the “reasonably foreseeable” requirement in two principal cases:
Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble78 and No GWEN Alliance Of Lane
City, Inc. v. Aldridge.79 In Warm Springs Dam, the petitioners challenged the
sufficiency of an EIS prepared by the Army Corps of Engineers for the

74. Id. at 768. The Court found that the twin aims of NEPA would not be served by
requiring an evaluation of an increase in trade volume. Id. FMCSA lacks the authority to act on
the information contained in the EIS. Id. Therefore, requiring an impact evaluation would not
aid in the agency’s decision-making process. Id. Similarly, consideration of the impact would
not serve the policy’s information purpose because the agency could not act on a larger
audience’s input on the effect of the higher volume. Id. at 768–69.
75. Id. at 769.
76. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356 (1989). As part of its
responsibility to manage the nation’s forests, the Forest Service has the statutory authority to
issue special-use permits for the operation of ski areas on federal lands. Id. at 336. After
preparing an environmental and financial feasibility study, the Forest Service decided to issue a
special-use permit for the development of a ski resort on Sandy Butte located in the Okanogan
National Forest in Okanogan County, Washington. See id. at 336–45 (describing in detail the
findings and procedures used in the Forest Service’s analysis). The Forest Service prepared an
EIS in conjunction with this decision. Id. at 338. Four organizations petitioned for review of the
Forest Service’s decision, alleging that the Forest Service’s study and its resulting EIS failed to
meet NEPA’s requirements adequately. Id. at 345–46. Although the trial court found that the
EIS was adequate, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the Forest Service improperly relied on
speculative mitigation measures when concluding that the impact on mule deer would be
minimal. Id. at 340–47. According to the Ninth Circuit, if the Forest Service lacks sufficient
information to assess the impact, it must conduct a worst-case analysis. Id. at 347 (citing
Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Reg’l Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 1987)). The
Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 356.
77. Id.
78. 621 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1980).
79. 855 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1988).

538

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:527

construction of Warm Springs Dam in Northern California.80 The petitioners
alleged that the EIS was insufficient because it did not consider the
consequences “of total failure of the dam in the wake of a catastrophic seismic
event.”81 However, the Ninth Circuit held that “an impact statement need not
discuss remote and highly speculative consequences . . . . Everyone recognizes
the catastrophic results of the failure of a dam; to detail these results would
serve no useful purpose.”82
Several years later, the Ninth Circuit amplified its view of the reasonably
foreseeable requirement in No GWEN,83 in which petitioners challenged the
sufficiency of the EA prepared in connection with an Air Force plan to
construct the Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN).84 Petitioners
alleged that the EA was inadequate because it “fail[ed] to discuss
environmental impacts of GWEN, including the impact of a nuclear exchange
which might be provoked, at least in part, by the installation or use of the
However, the petitioners conceded that GWEN’s
GWEN system.”85
provocation of nuclear war was merely speculative.86 The Ninth Circuit found
“the contention that GWEN would be a primary target in a nuclear war [would]
be equally speculative.”87 As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that a nuclear war
was not a reasonably foreseeable effect of the Air Force’s decision to construct
the GWEN system because the causal link was too attenuated, and, therefore,
the impact of nuclear war did not need to be considered in the EA.88
E. NRC Actions Before San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC
Shortly after the September 11th terrorist attacks, community organizations
and local governments sought to intervene in several ongoing NRC license
reviews through the NRC’s AEA-mandated public-hearing process.89 These
80. Warms Springs Dam, 621 F.2d at 1019–20.
81. Id. at 1026.
82. Id. at 1026–27.
83. No GWEN, 855 F.2d at 1385–86 & n.1.
84. Id. at 1381. GWEN is designed to send messages to U.S. forces during and after nuclear
war. Id. GWEN’s system involves the construction of numerous 300-foot radio towers and “is
designed to withstand the electromagnetic pulse generated by atmospheric nuclear detonations.”
Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1386.
87. Id.
88. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit echoed its previous sentiments in
Warm Springs Dam that “everyone recognizes that [the] effects [of a nuclear exchange] would be
catastrophic. Detailing these results would serve no useful purpose.” Id. (citing Warm Springs
Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 1980)).
89. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(a) (2010) (providing that “any person whose interest may be
affected by a proceeding and who desires to participate as a party must file a written request for
hearing and a specification of the contentions which the person seeks to have litigated in the
hearing,” and citing the NRC’s standards in determining if the person may intervene).
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intervenors sought to insure that acts of terrorism were adequately accounted
for by asking the NRC to address them in the NEPA process.90
The Commission took action on the first four of these petitions on December
18, 2002.91 In Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., the NRC laid out four reasons
why addressing risks of terrorism through an EIS is inappropriate.92 First, the
Commission argued that the action was beyond the “rule of reason” because a
terrorist attack on a particular facility is not reasonably foreseeable.93 Second,
the Commission argued that, “[t]he horrors of September 11 notwithstanding,”
it is not possible to quantify the likelihood of a terrorist attack on a particular
facility.94 Furthermore, consistent with Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v.

90. See, e.g., infra note 92.
91. See Dominion Nuclear Conn., Inc., 56 N.R.C. 368, 368 (2002); Duke Cogema Stone &
Webster, 56 N.R.C. 335, 335 (2002); Duke Energy Corp., 56 N.R.C. 358, 358 (2002); Private
Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 340 (2002).
Private Fuel Storage involved Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C.’s 1997 application for a
license to possess and store spent nuclear fuel in an independent spent-fuel-storage installation on
an Indian reservation in Utah. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 47 N.R.C. 142, 157 (Atomic Safety
& Licensing Bd. 1998). After the September 11th attacks, the State of Utah intervened in this
licensing proceeding and contended that the attacks revealed an increased likelihood for a similar
attack on the proposed spent-fuel installation, which thereby required a NEPA review because
such an attack was reasonably foreseeable. Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 345–46.
Duke Cogema Stone & Webster involved the Duke Cogema Stone & Webster
consortium’s February 2001 application to construct a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication
facility on the U.S. Department of Energy’s Savannah River, South Carolina site. Duke Cogema
Stone & Webster, 56 N.R.C. at 337. MOX fuel—a blend of uranium oxide (conventional fuel)
and plutonium oxides—serves as means to recycle surplus weapons-grade plutonium and can be
used by commercial nuclear power stations to generate electricity. Id. Georgians Against
Nuclear Energy sought to intervene and demanded a NEPA review of terrorism impacts. Id.
Duke Energy Corp. involved the Duke Energy Corporation’s June 2001 application to
renew the operating licenses of four nuclear power plants for twenty more years of operation.
Duke Energy Corp., 56 N.R.C. at 362. The Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League
intervened and asserted that renewal of the licenses would increase the likelihood of a terrorist
attack on the nuclear power plant. Id. at 361. In addition to holding that a terrorism review was
not required for the reasons set forth in Private Fuel Storage, the Commission held that
contentions relating to terrorism are beyond the scope of a licensing renewal because “a license
renewal is narrow in scope, confined to aging analyses of the plant’s structures, systems and
components.” Id. at 362–65.
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. involved Dominion Nuclear Connecticut’s March
1999 application for a license amendment to increase the storage capacity of the spent-fuel pool.
Dominion Nuclear Conn., Inc., 56 N.R.C. at 368–69. Two intervenors, the Connecticut Coalition
Against Millstone and the Long Island Coalition Against Millstone, asserted that the NRC must
prepare an EIS evaluating the impact of a potential terrorist attack on the spent-fuel pool and
assessing the appropriateness of alternatives such as dry-cask storage. Id.
92. Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 347–55.
93. Id. at 348–49 (“Here, the possibility of a terrorist attack . . . is speculative and simply
too far removed from the natural or expected consequences of agency action to require a study
under NEPA.”).
94. Id. at 350.
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NRC,95 the NRC determined that it could not put forward a meaningful
analysis of the risk to the environment.96 Third, the Commission argued that
the “theoretical possibility” of a terrorist attack was “not the same as a
‘reasonably foreseeable impact’” of such an event; simply assuming that the
event would occur just because it could occur amounts to a worst-case
scenario, which the Court in Methow Valley held was not required.97 Finally,
the Commission maintained its long-held position that discussing security
vulnerabilities is a matter of national defense that should not be conducted in
public, and, “in the absence of . . . clear Congressional direction to that end,”
the Commission will not do so.98
F. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC
In December 2001, PG&E applied for a license from the NRC to operate an
independent spent-fuel storage installation at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.99
The San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace and eleven other petitioners requested
to intervene in the licensing process.100 The petitioners made several
contentions, including an assertion that PG&E’s evaluation “of environmental
impacts [was] inadequate because it [did] not include the consequences of
destructive acts of malice or insanity against the proposed [independent
spent-fuel-storage installation].”101 On the basis of its previous findings in
Private Fuel Storage, the NRC dismissed the petitioners’ contention.102 The
95. In Limerick Ecology Action, the Third Circuit deferred to the NRC’s judgment not to
consider the risks of sabotage in an EIS when licensing a reactor for operation because “current
risk assessment techniques could not provide a meaningful basis upon which to measure such
risks.” Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 743 (3d Cir. 1989). Furthermore,
the citizens’ group challenging the sufficiency of the EIS failed to rebut the NRC’s conclusion
that the risks could not be assessed. Id.
96. Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 350–51.
97. Id. at 352 (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356
(1989)); see also supra Part I.B.3.
98. Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 355 (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co., 4 A.E.C. 9, 13–
14 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d sub nom. Siegel v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778 (D.C.
Cir. 1968)). A NEPA review is a process that involves the public in both providing comment
and contesting environmental findings; as a result, it is not the appropriate forum to consider
matters of national defense. Id. at 354–55. The Commission distinguished the holding of
Weinberger, arguing that a NEPA review might be useful to an agency “that otherwise might not
consider an issue relevant to licensing,” but would not provide benefit to the NRC, which
“already . . . review[s] terrorism from every nearly conceivable angle.” Id. at 356–57.
99. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 2006). The
Diablo Canyon Power Plant is located in San Luis Obispo, California. Id. at 1019–20; see also
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 56 N.R.C. 413, 419 (Atomic Safety & Licensing Bd. 2002).
100. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 56 N.R.C. at 419.
101. Id. at 447. Two other environmental contentions (EC-2 and EC-3) also included acts of
terrorism, but the NRC only considered the terrorism actions as part of the challenge articulated
in EC-1. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 57 N.R.C. 1, 4–6 (2003).
102. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 57 N.R.C. at 6. Before the NRC commissioner’s hearing of the
petition, the NRC’s Atomic Safety Licensing Board (Board) first reviewed the petition. The
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petitioners appealed, alleging that the NRC violated NEPA by not considering
acts of terrorism in the EA.103
The Ninth Circuit considered the four reasons articulated by the NRC in
Private Fuel Storage and rejected each one.104 Regarding the first reason, the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the NRC had relied upon the Supreme
Court’s analysis in Metropolitan Edison to support its contention that an act of
terrorism was outside the rule of reason,105 but distinguished Metropolitan
Edison’s proximate-cause analogy from the current case.106 Both cases
involved three events: “(1) a major federal action; (2) a change in the physical
environment; and (3) an effect.”107 The court reasoned that in Metropolitan
Edison the relationship at issue was between points two and three,108 in that the
portion of the causal chain was too far attenuated between the risk of a nuclear
accident (a change in the physical environment) and the decline of the
psychological health of the human population (the effect).109 However, the
causal relationship at issue in San Luis Obispo was between the first and
second events—the licensing of the independent spent-fuel-storage installation
(a federal act) and the risk of a terrorist attack (a change in the physical
Board ruled that the environmental report did not need to address acts of terrorism because the
NRC had implemented a regulation specifically providing that applicants for licenses do not have
to address acts of terrorism in their application. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 56 N.R.C. at 448 (citing 10
C.F.R. § 50.13 (2011)). The regulation provides that applicants for a license or license renewal
do not need to include design features that would specifically protect against attacks by enemies
of the United States, including attacks incident to actions against the defense activities of the
United States. 10 C.F.R. § 50.13 (2011). However, the Board referred the issue to the
Commission for consideration. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 56 N.R.C. at 448.
103. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1019–20. The petitioners also argued that the NRC
violated the AEA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Id. at 1024. The petitioners
alleged, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the NRC violated the AEA’s hearing provisions by
denying petitioners a hearing on including acts of terrorism in the EIS and a hearing on the
security measures for Diablo Canyon as a whole. Id. at 1024–27. The petitioners also claimed
that the NRC violated the notice and comment provisions of the APA’s rulemaking requirements.
Id. at 1027.
The flaw in Petitioners’ argument is the mistaken assertion that the NRC’s decisions
were factual and not legal. If the NRC’s conclusion that terrorism need not be
examined under NEPA were factual, then Petitioners would be correct that its
determination would have to comply with APA rulemaking requirements, including
notice and comment, or else the agency would have to permit petitioners to challenge it
in every proceeding where it was disputed.
Id. Because the NRC decided they were not required to evaluate terrorism under NEPA as a
matter of law, the Ninth Circuit determined that the NRC had complied with the APA. Id. at
1027–28.
104. Id. at 1028; see supra Part I.D.
105. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1029.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see also Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 775
(1983).
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environment).110 The Ninth Circuit held that the Metropolitan Edison analysis
did not apply “because it discusse[d] a different type of causation than that at
issue in this case.”111 Instead, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the appropriate
standard to apply in San Luis Obispo was the remote and highly speculative
standard articulated in Warm Springs Dam and No GWEN.112
Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit determined “that it was
unreasonable for the NRC to categorically dismiss the possibility of [a]
terrorist attack . . . as too remote and highly speculative.”113 The court further
recognized that the NRC’s view was inconsistent with the Commission’s
efforts to prevent terrorist attacks against nuclear facilities after September
11th.114 Therefore, the court concluded that “the possibility of [a] terrorist
attack is not so ‘remote and highly speculative’ as to be beyond NEPA’s
requirements.” 115
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the NRC’s second factor from Private Fuel
Storage, finding that the NRC should not exclude acts of terrorism from the
NEPA analysis simply because a risk is not quantifiable.116 Rather, the NRC
could conduct a qualitative assessment of the uncertain risk in the absence of
precise quantification of that risk.117 The court explained that because the
NRC performs this type of qualitative analysis in other contexts, it should be
able to apply this analysis to acts of terrorism as well.118 Furthermore, the
court noted the NRC’s actions in other areas to combat terrorism indicated that
the NRC found the risk to be significant.119 Therefore, the court concluded
that the lack of precise quantification did not excuse the NRC from considering
the significance of such a risk in the NEPA analysis.120
110. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1030.
111. Id. at 1029–30 (quoting No GWEN Alliance v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir.
1988)).
112. Id. at 1030. The NRC had previously determined that a terrorist attack was speculative
as a matter of law, and, as a result, did not address the petitioners’ factual contentions that the
probability of a terrorist attack on the power plant would actually increase as a result of the
independent spent-fuel-storage installation. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1030–31.
115. Id. at 1031.
116. Id. at 1031–32.
117. Id. at 1031 (“It is therefore possible to conduct a low probability-high consequence
analysis without quantifying the precise probability of risk.”).
118. Id. at 1031–32.
119. Id. at 1032. The court also pointed to the fact that the Department of Homeland
Security uses an advisory system that provides a general assessment of the risk of terrorist
attacks. Id.
120. Id. at 1032 (“This leaves the Commission in the tenuous position of insisting on the
impossibility of a meaningful, i.e., quantifiable assessment of terrorist attacks, while claiming to
have undertaken precisely such an assessment in other contexts.”). The court argued that, even if
it accepted the argument that the risk must be quantifiable, the NRC failed to demonstrate that the
risk was unquantifiable. Id. at 1032.
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The NRC asserted as its third reason in Private Fuel Storage that evaluating
terrorist attacks in the NEPA analysis equated to a worst-case scenario, which
is no longer required under Supreme Court precedent.121 The Ninth Circuit
agreed “that NEPA does not require a worst-case analysis.”122 However, it
concluded that in this situation the NRC was not being asked to perform a
worst-case analysis.123 The Ninth Circuit noted that appropriate worst-case
analysis, as set forth by CEQ, includes both high- and low-probability events;
therefore, the distinguishing characteristic of worst-case scenarios cannot be
probability alone.124 As a result, the court determined that a terrorist attack
should not escape analysis on the grounds of being a worst-case scenario solely
because it is of “low or indeterminate probability.”125 Because the petitioners
“d[id] not seek to require the NRC to analyze the most extreme (i.e., the
‘worst’) possible environmental impacts of a terrorist attack,” the court
concluded that evaluating the terrorist attack as part of the NEPA process was
not a worst-case analysis.126
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the NRC’s fourth contention in Private Fuel
Storage that it could not comply with the NEPA requirements because of the
security risks inherent in disclosure of sensitive information.127 In dismissing
this factor, the court cited to Weinberger as a demonstration that although the
NEPA process may be modified for national-security considerations, such
considerations do not exempt an agency from the requirements of the
evaluation altogether.128

121. Id.; see also Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 351–52 (2002). In its brief to
the Ninth Circuit, the NRC argued that to evaluate the risk and effects of a terrorist attack, the
Commission would be forced to make a chain of assumptions that would only be theoretically
possible. Brief for the Federal Respondents at 40–41, San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v.
NRC, 449 F.3d at 1016 (No. 03-74628). An evaluation would require assuming that a terrorist
attack would occur, succeed, and cause the release of radioactive materials. Id. According to the
NRC, using a “theoretical possibility” analysis is the equivalent of a worst-case approach because
it does not rise to the level of a “reasonably foreseeable” impact. Id. at 41.
122. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1033.
123. Id. at 1033–34.
124. Id Effects of “low or indeterminate probability” may need to be considered if they have
significant consequences, “‘provided that the analysis of the impacts is supported by credible
scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule of reason.’” Id.
(quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4) (2010)).
125. Id. at 1034.
126. Id. (“Instead, they seek an analysis of the range of environmental impacts likely to result
in the event of a terrorist attack . . . .”).
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Earth Educ. Project, 454 U.S.
139, 145–47 (1981)).
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After rejecting all four of the NRC’s reasons for refusing to consider acts of
terrorism in the NEPA analysis, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the
NRC with instructions to consider acts of terrorism in its analysis.129
G. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. NRC
In July 2005, AmerGen Energy Co. sought a twenty-year renewal on its
operating license for the Oyster Creek Generating Station.130 The New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection (New Jersey) filed a request to
intervene131 alleging that the environmental report was deficient because it
failed to consider an aircraft-attack scenario.132 In February 2006, before the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in San Luis Obispo, the Atomic Safety Licensing
Board (ASLB) rejected this contention, citing the Commission’s previous
decisions, in particular Private Fuel Storage.133
The Commission considered the appeal of the ASLB’s decision after the
Ninth Circuit had decided San Luis Obispo, and affirmed the Board’s
decision.134 The Commission disagreed with the Ninth Circuit for the reasons
articulated in Private Fuel Storage and the Solicitor General’s brief to the
Supreme Court in San Luis Obispo.135 The Solicitor General had argued that
129. Id. at 1035. This issue was not resolved on remand to the NRC where the NRC staff
prepared a supplemental EA (SEA) with a finding of no significant impact. See San Luis Obispo
Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 635 F.3d 1109, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2011). Petitioner San Luis Obispo
Mothers for Peace challenged two NRC actions: (1) the NRC’s refusal to hold a closed
adjudicatory hearing allowing petitioner’s access to classified and sensitive government
information, and (2) the NRC’s finding of no significant impact in the SEA. Id. at 6. The Ninth
Circuit rejected both challenges. Id. at 111. The court upheld the sufficiency of the SEA, finding
that NEPA and the AEA did not require the NRC to conduct a hearing in which FOIA-exempt
information would be disclosed. Id.
130. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2009). Oyster Creek
Generating Station is located in Ocean County, New Jersey. Id. Commercial nuclear power
plants are initially licensed for up to forty years, but the license may be renewed for another
twenty years. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(c) (2006); 10 C.F.R. § 54.31(b) (2010). The initial operating
license for the Oyster Creek Generating Station was set to expire on April 9, 2009. AmerGen
Energy Co., 63 N.R.C. 188, 193 (Atomic Safety & Licensing Bd. 2006).
131. AmerGen Energy Co., 63 N.R.C. at 193.
132. See id. at 199–200.
133. See id. at 200–01 (citing Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 349 (2002))
(holding that New Jersey’s stated basis for intervening—the NRC’s failure to consider the
environmental impacts of an airborne terrorist attack—fell outside of the scope of the
license-renewal proceedings).
134. AmerGen Energy Co., 65 N.R.C. 124, 126 (2007). The Commission acknowledged that
it must follow Ninth Circuit precedent when deciding matters within that circuit, but asserted that
it was not required to adhere to an unfavorable decision when the same issue is before another
circuit. Id. at 128–29 & n.14 (citing United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 173
(1984)).
135. Id. at 129. PG&E appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in San Luis Obispo to the
Supreme Court. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Luis Obispo
Mothers for Peace, 549 U.S. 1166 (2007) (No. 06-466) [hereinafter PG&E Certiorari Petition].
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the Ninth Circuit erred by failing to adhere to precedent such as Metropolitan
Edison and Public Citizen, which established the need for a reasonably close
causal relationship, analogized by the Supreme Court to the proximate-cause
analysis used in tort law.136 Additionally, the Commission decided that, even
if it followed San Luis Obispo, the NRC had already considered the effects of
terrorism in a generic EIS (GEIS) for license renewal,137 from which it
“concluded that the core damage and radiological release from such acts would
be no worse than the damage and release to be expected from internally
initiated events.”138 New Jersey subsequently appealed the Commission’s
decision to the Third Circuit.139
The Third Circuit affirmed the NRC’s decision for two separate reasons:
First, [New Jersey] has not shown that there is a “reasonably close
causal relationship” between the Oyster Creek relicensing
proceeding and the environmental effects of a hypothetical aircraft
attack. Accordingly, such an attack does not warrant NEPA
evaluation.
Second, the NRC has already considered the
Despite the NRC’s strong opposition to the San Luis Obispo decision, the Solicitor General
elected not to file a separate petition for writ of certiorari because no direct conflict existed
between the circuits and it was unclear how burdensome San Luis Obispo would actually prove to
be on the NRC. Brief for the Federal Respondents at 17, San Luis Obispo, 549 U.S. 1166 (No.
06-466) [hereinafter Federal Respondent’s Brief].
136. Federal Respondent’s Brief, supra note 135, at 6–7. The Solicitor General,
characterized the Ninth Circuit’s decision as “unprecedented” and argued that the decision
created a tension in the law. Id. at 6. Furthermore, the Solicitor General contended that the
decision could become “highly disruptive for [the] NRC (and perhaps other federal agencies).”
Id. at 14.
137. The NRC has developed a GEIS for license renewal of existing plants. See OFFICE OF
NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, GENERIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR LICENSE RENEWAL OF NUCLEAR PLANTS: MAIN
REPORT (NUREG-1437) (1996) [hereinafter GEIS FOR LICENSE RENEWAL]. This GEIS has three
primary objectives:
(1) to provide an understanding of the types and severity of environmental impacts that
may occur as a result of license renewal of nuclear power plants under 10 CFR Part 54,
(2) to identify and assess those impacts that are expected to be generic to license
renewal, and (3) to support a rulemaking (10 CFR Part 51) to define the number and
scope of issues that need to be addressed by the applicants in plant-by-plant license
renewal proceedings.
Id. at Abstract. Site-specific EISs are prepared as part of the license-renewal process and
supplement the GEIS. See id. §§ 1.73–1.76. Notably, the GEIS provides:
Although the threat of sabotage events cannot be accurately quantified, the commission
believes that acts of sabotage are not reasonably expected. Nonetheless, if such events
were to occur, the commission would expect that resultant core damage and
radiological releases would be no worse than those expected from internally initiated
events.
Id. § 5.3.3.1.
138. AmerGen Energy Co., 65 N.R.C. at 131 (2007) (quoting AmerGen Energy Co., 63
N.R.C. 188, 201 n.8 (Atomic Safety & Licensing Bd. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 133 (3d Cir. 2009).

546

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:527

environmental effects of a hypothetical terrorist attack on a nuclear
plant and found that these effects would be no worse than those
caused by a severe accident.140
Citing Metropolitan Edison and Public Citizen, the Third Circuit used tort
law’s proximate-cause analysis to inform its decision that the causal nexus
between the agency action (NRC’s renewal of a license) and the purported
effect (aircraft attack on a nuclear facility) is too attenuated to satisfy the
reasonably close causal-relationship test.141 Just as the FMCSA had no
authority to prevent the effect in Public Citizen, the NRC lacks control of the
airspace above the facilities it regulates.142 From this the court reasoned that
an airborne attack on the Oyster Creek Generating Station could only result
from “at least two intervening events: (1) the act of a third-party criminal and
(2) the failure of all government agencies specifically charged with preventing
terrorist attacks.”143 Applying tort causation concepts, the court determined
that an airborne terrorist attack (third-party criminal act) would be a
superseding cause, thus intervening as the legally relevant cause of any
environmental effect resulting from the attack.144 Therefore, the Third Circuit
concluded that an environmental impact would not be the result of a major
federal action subject to NEPA.145
In further support of this conclusion, the Third Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court in Metropolitan Edison had admonished courts to draw a line
for imposing NEPA responsibilities in a way manageable for the agencies.146
According to the Third Circuit, drawing this line to include assessing the
consequences of an airborne attack would require the NRC to “spend time and
resources assessing security risks over which it has little control and which
would not likely aid its other assigned functions to assure the safety and
security of nuclear facilities.”147
The Third Circuit also determined that the NRC had already considered the
effects of a terrorist attack in the GEIS for License Renewal of Nuclear
Plants.148 Furthermore, the court held that New Jersey had not met its burden
140. Id. at 136 (citations omitted).
141. See id. at 139–40.
142. Id. at 139 (discussing how the Supreme Court in Public Citizen declined to find a
reasonably close causal relationship because the Agency, FMCSA, lacked control over the
volume of Mexican motor carriers in the United States); cf. supra Part I.C.2.
143. Id. at 140.
144. Id. at 140–41 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 442, 448 (1965)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 147 (citing Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766,
774 n.7 (1983)).
147. Id.
148. See id. at 143; see also supra note 138. The Third Circuit found the analysis in a GEIS
to be an appropriate means for conducting the EIS. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 139
(citing Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, Inc. 462 U.S. 87, 101 (1983)). Additionally, the court
deemed it improper to challenge the GEIS analysis in an adjudicatory hearing because the NRC
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of demonstrating “that the NRC could [have] evaluate[d] the risks more
meaningfully than it already ha[d] done.”149 Because the Third Circuit
concluded that NEPA did not require an assessment of possible terrorist
attacks, and that even if it did, the NRC had already sufficiently evaluated
those impacts, the court affirmed the NRC’s decision.150
H. The NRC Addresses Acts of Terrorism Outside of NEPA
Pursuant to its responsibility under the AEA,151 the NRC has enacted rules
requiring licensees to protect themselves against certain acts of radiological
sabotage, including terrorism.152 The regulations provide for two general
requirements for securing special nuclear material and the plants that use it: (1)
specific physical protection requirements,153 and (2) a requirement that the
overall safeguard systems protect against specific design-basis threats set forth
in the regulations.154
The NRC requires a licensee to have security measures capable of repelling
an attack on the facility.155 The NRC’s design-basis threats simulate the
magnitude of a potential attack to test the strength of the facility’s security.156
The NRC has updated the design-basis threats in response to anticipated
changes in the types of attacks against the United States.157 The next several
paragraphs chronicle the NRC’s modifications to the design-basis threats since
the early 1990s.
The design-basis threats were initially very limited in scope, and “protected
only against industrial sabotage by individuals and groups with possible inside
information and hand-held weapons.”158 In response to a vehicle intrusion
had codified the GEIS in rulemaking. Id. Lastly, the court recognized that the site-specific EIS
had properly assessed the alternatives to mitigate severe accidents. Id. at 143–44.
149. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 144.
150. Id. at 143–44.
151. See supra Part I.A.
152. See 10 C.F.R. § 73.1 (2010).
153. Id. § 73.1(a); see, e.g., id. § 73.55 (providing the requirements for physical protection of
licensed activities).
Physical-protection requirements include erecting physical barriers,
§ 73.55(e)(1)(i), maintaining access controls, § 73.55(g)(1), and establishing search programs,
§ 73.55(h)(1). The regulations also specifically require bullet-resistant barriers around the reactor
control room, § 73.55(e)(5), an isolation zone around the perimeter of the facility, § 73.55(e)(7),
and vehicle-control measures (both water and land), § 73.55(e)(10).
154. 10 C.F.R. § 73.1(a).
155. See MARK HOLT & ANTHONY ANDREWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34331,
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY AND VULNERABILITIES 1 (2010).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1–2.
158. See Pub. Citizen v. NRC, 573 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2009) (tracing the origins of the
design-basis-threat rules); see also Requirements for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Power
Reactors, 42 Fed. Reg. 10,836, 10,836–40 (Feb. 24, 1977) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 50 & 73)
(adopting the NRC’s 1977 final rules for the protection of nuclear facilities against security
threats).
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incident at TMI and the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the NRC
subsequently amended the design-basis-threat rules in 1994.159
Following the September 11th attacks, the NRC took several actions to
address the security of nuclear power plants.160 In the immediate aftermath of
the attacks, the NRC issued advisories to licensed facilities aimed at
heightening their security and ability to respond effectively to an attack.161
Although licensees voluntarily took action in response to the threat advisories,
in March of 2002, the NRC issued an order mandating additional safeguards
beyond the regulatory requirements because of the high-level threat
environment.162
The NRC has taken specific action to strengthen the design-basis-threat rule
and established the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response to
oversee these changes.163 In 2004, as part of its design-basis-threat
improvements, the NRC began requiring “force-on-force” security exercises at
each nuclear power plant every three years.164 The NRC approved a final rule
revising the design-basis-threat rule on March 19, 2007.165 Although specific
159. See Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants, 59 Fed.
Reg. 38,889, 38,889 (Aug. 1, 1994) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 73) (revising the design-basis-threat
rules to include a possible attack by land vehicle, including the use of a land-vehicle bomb). The
new rules required licensees to provide defensive capabilities to meet these threats. Id. at 38,900.
For example, licensees were required to perform bomb-blast analyses, establish barriers to control
vehicle access, and provide equipment necessary to prevent radiological releases. Id. at
38,899–90.
160. See Order Modifying Operating Power Reactor Licenses, 67 Fed. Reg. 9792, 9792 (Mar.
4, 2002) (providing immediate security measures for nuclear facilities in the wake of September
11th).
161. Id. As a result of these advisories, the facilities moved to the highest level of security
and “increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, added security posts, installed
additional physical barriers, increased the standoff distance for vehicle checks, enhanced
coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, and imposed more restrictive site
access controls for all personnel.” Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 343–44 (2002)
(footnotes omitted).
162. Order Modifying Operating Power Reactor Licenses, 67 Fed. Reg. at 9792.
163. See HOLT & ANDREWS, supra note 155, at 2.
164. Id. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 codified the force-on-force exercise requirements:
(1) The security evaluations shall include force-on-force exercises.
(2) The force-on-force exercises shall, to the maximum extent practicable, simulate
security threats in accordance with any design-basis threat applicable to a facility.
(3) In conducting a security evaluation, the Commission shall mitigate any potential
conflict of interest that could influence the results of a force-on-force exercise, as the
Commission determines to be necessary and appropriate.
Pub. L. No. 109-58, sec. 651(a)(1), § 170D(b), 119 Stat. 594, 799 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210d(b) (2006)).
165. See Design Basis Threat, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,705, 12,705 (Mar. 19, 2007) (codified at 10
C.F.R. pt. 73). In enacting the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress required the NRC to revise
the design-basis threat through rulemaking. Energy Policy Act of 2005, sec. 651(a)(1),
§ 170E(a), 119 Stat. at 799. The Act provided a non-exhaustive list of potential factors for the
NRC to consider in its rulemaking, including:
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details of the revised design-basis threats remain classified,166 the revised
model strengthened the assumed capabilities of adversaries, their equipment,
their tactics, and their resolve.167 The NRC excluded an air-based attack from
the design-basis threat, concluding that a private security force could not
reasonably be expected to defend against such an attack168—that responsibility
rests with other federal entities.169
(1) the events of September 11, 2001;
(2) an assessment of physical, cyber, biochemical, and other terrorist threats;
(3) the potential for attack on facilities by multiple coordinated teams of a large number
of individuals;
(4) the potential for assistance in an attack from several persons employed at the
facility;
(5) the potential for suicide attacks;
(6) the potential for water-based and air-based threats;
(7) the potential use of explosive devices of considerable size and other modern
weaponry;
(8) the potential for attacks by persons with a sophisticated knowledge of facility
operations;
(9) the potential for fires, especially fires of long duration;
(10) the potential for attacks on spent fuel shipments by multiple coordinated teams of a
large number of individuals;
(11) the adequacy of planning to protect the public health and safety at and around
nuclear facilities, as appropriate, in the event of a terrorist attack against a nuclear
facility; and
(12) the potential for theft and diversion of nuclear materials from such facilities.
Id. at sec. 651(a)(1), § 170E(b), 119 Stat. at 800.
166. Design Basis Threat, 72 Fed. Reg. at 12,706.
167. See HOLT & ANDREWS, supra note 155, at 3.
168. Design Basis Threat, 72 Fed. Reg. at 12,710.
169. Id. at 12,710. Shortly after its enactment, several petitioners challenged the revised
design-basis-threat rule in the Ninth Circuit. Pub. Citizen v. NRC, 573 F.3d 916, 917 (9th Cir.
2009). The Petitioners—Public Citizen Inc., San Luis Obispo Mothers For Peace, the State of
New York, and amicus State of California—claimed that the “Commission acted arbitrarily and
capriciously and contrary to law by refusing to include the threat of air attacks in the final revised
[design-basis-threat] rule” and that the Commission violated NEPA “by not considering the risk
of an airborne terrorist attack in its [EA].” Id. at 917–18. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and upheld
the NRC’s actions. Id. at 918. The court found that it was not arbitrary and capricious to limit
the scope of the design-basis rule to reasonable expectations of private security forces’
capabilities. Id. at 929. Similarly, the court asserted the following in support of its finding that
the NRC sufficiently considered the threat of airborne attacks:
It is not implausible for the Commission to determine that most attacks will be
prevented in the first instance by the coordinated efforts of multiple federal agencies. It
is also not implausible, based on the evidence before the Commission, for the NRC to
conclude that, in the event that an airplane is able to strike a facility, the mitigative and
protective measures imposed through the [design basis threat] Orders and the revised
[design-basis-threat] would likely prevent any serious harm from occurring.
Id. at 926. From these conclusions, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the NEPA claim, finding that the
NRC had discretion to exclude air-based threats from the scope of the design-threat rule and,
consequently, the NRC was not required to consider the impact of that decision in the EA. Id. at
928–29.
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II. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ASSESSING ACTS OF TERRORISM IN AN EIS
The reasons advanced for not including acts of terrorism in a NEPA analysis
are threefold. First, a terrorism evaluation as part of the NEPA analysis does
not add anything to the decision-making process for the agency. Second, acts
of terrorism are beyond the rule of reason applied to determine the events that
need to be considered. Third, the NEPA process is not suitable for sensitive
security issues. This Part addresses each of these arguments in turn.
A. The NRC Does Not Benefit from Evaluating Terrorism in a NEPA Analysis.
The NRC maintained that it would not benefit from further study of these
issues under NEPA because it already adequately addressed the matter through
current obligations under the AEA and its ongoing efforts to ensure the
security of nuclear power plants.170 The security threat to nuclear facilities is
continually evolving, while the force-on-force exercises continue to expose
security vulnerabilities.171 In order for the NRC to fulfill its obligations under
the AEA to ensure the common defense and security and provide adequate
protection to the health and safety of the public,172 the NRC continually
updates the security of nuclear facilities by issuing orders and revising the
regulations.173 A NEPA review of the security at nuclear facilities would not
add to this continuous evaluation. Additionally, the NEPA process lacks the
flexibility that providing nuclear security requires.174 A NEPA evaluation
considers only a snapshot of the potential environmental impact at the
particular time of the decision.175 Therefore, evaluating acts of terrorism under

170. See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 356–57 (2002) (“Thus, even if
terrorism were a matter cognizable under NEPA . . . it would elevate form over substance to insist
that [the NRC] supplement [its] ongoing comprehensive review with a duplicative or formalistic
NEPA study.”).
171. Id. at 342.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2006).
173. See, e.g., Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants, 59
Fed. Reg. 38,889, 38,889 (Aug. 1, 1994) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 73) (promulgating a final rule
requiring nuclear facilities to protect against the new threat of attack via land vehicles); see also
Order Modifying Operating Power Reactor Licenses, 67 Fed. Reg. 9792, 9792 (Mar. 4, 2002)
(providing immediate security measures after September 11th).
174. See, e.g., N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 141 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting
how analysis of nuclear security risks implicates decisions broader than those contemplated by
NEPA, and how these decisions must be centralized, not made on a site-specific basis).
175. NEPA requires a site-specific analysis of environmental impacts. See id. Advocates for
including terrorism in the site-specific EIS have focused on the uniqueness of each plant—for
example, reactor type and proximity to population centers—when considering the effects of an
attack. See, e.g., Amanda Mott, Comment, Should the Threat of a Terrorist Attack on a Nuclear
Power Plant be Considered Under NEPA Review?, 12 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 333,
336–37 (2007). However, as the Third Circuit noted in New Jersey, a comprehensive terrorism
analysis is not manageable under the limited scope of a NEPA review. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
561 F.3d at 141.
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NEPA would violate the “rule of reason” because doing so would not aid in the
decision-making process.176
However, critics of the NRC’s position argue that excluding these actions
from the NEPA process would be inconsistent with NEPA’s aim to inform the
public that an agency has considered environmental impacts in its decision.177
This position ignores the fact that the public may already be properly informed
of the NRC’s actions to assess terrorist risks outside of the NEPA process
without disclosing confidential information.178 Although the public is not
informed of every detail of the NRC’s security requirements or of the
design-basis threats for security purposes, the public nature of the rulemaking
process offers assurances to the public that the NRC is addressing the threat of
terrorism in accordance with their obligations under the AEA.179
Critics, such as the Ninth Circuit in San Luis Obispo, also point out that
“compliance with the AEA does not excuse the [NRC] from its NEPA
obligations.”180 However, this statement of law is moot because, as this
Comment sets forth, the NRC is not required to consider terrorist acts to meet
its NEPA obligations.181 NEPA evaluations are “supplementary” to the NRC’s
responsibilities under the AEA, rather than duplicative.182 As the Supreme
Court stated in Public Citizen, the “rule of reason” allows agencies to
determine if, and to what extent, they are required to perform an EIS based on
the utility of any new information the agency might obtain from the EIS for the
decision-making process.183 Furthermore, because the NRC continually uses
the rulemaking process to update and enforce design-basis threats, a NEPA
analysis would provide no new information.184 As a result of the security
requirements and enforcement efforts the NRC has undertaken pursuant to the
AEA, an additional NEPA review is duplicative and unnecessary.

176. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004) (characterizing the “rule
of reason” as a limitation on the scope of NEPA review based on the usefulness of potential
information).
177. See Michael Hill, Note, NEPA at the Limits of Risk Assessment: Whether to Discuss a
Potential Terrorist Attack on a Nuclear Power Plant Under the National Environmental Policy
Act, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 3007, 3045 (2010) (arguing that taking action outside of NEPA is
insufficient until the public has been properly informed through the NEPA process).
178. See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 356 (2002) (describing numerous other
efforts taken by the NRC to address risks of terrorism).
179. See, e.g., Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants, 59
Fed. Reg. 38,889, 38,889 (Aug. 1, 1994) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 73) (discussing numerous
public comments submitted during the NRC rulemaking process).
180. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 2006).
181. See infra Part III.A.
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (2006).
183. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004); see also Metro. Edison Co.
v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 n.7 (1983); supra Part I.C.1.
184. See supra Part I.H.
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B. NEPA’s Rule-of-Reason Analysis
As recognized by courts and agencies alike, the rule of reason governs the
application of NEPA.185 Although this rule is susceptible to a number of
different formulations,186 these formulations can be reduced to three
categories: (1) the proximate-cause approach from Metropolitan Edison and
Public Citizen, (2) a reasonably foreseeable standard, and (3) the proposition
that agencies are not required to prepare a worst-case analysis.187
1. Applicability of Metropolitan Edison and the Proximate-Cause Argument
The Third and Ninth Circuits both argue that their decisions are consistent
with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Metropolitan Edison.188 According to
the Ninth Circuit in San Luis Obispo, the proximate-cause analysis in
Metropolitan Edison only applies to the causal link between a change in the
physical environment and a purported effect of that change, which is separate
from, and inapplicable to, the causal link between an agency action and the
change in the environment.189 Although the words of Metropolitan Edison
could be read in this narrower manner,190 the Supreme Court’s application of
the proximate-cause test in Public Citizen—as the Third Circuit pointed out in
New Jersey—does not support the Ninth Circuit’s limited approach.191
In Public Citizen, a unanimous Supreme Court applied the proximate-cause
test between the agency action and the change in the environment.192 The
185. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767–68; Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359, 367–68
(D.C. Cir. 2000); see also National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or
Unavailable Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,621 (Apr. 25, 1986) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt.
1502) (“The rule of reason is basically a judicial device to ensure that common sense and reason
are not lost in the rubric of regulation.”).
186. See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 348–49 (2002) (discussing the multiple
formulations of the rule of reason in the context of NEPA, including a pure analysis of
“reasonably foreseeable” impacts, a rule of reasonableness excluding “‘remote and speculative’
impacts or ‘worst-case’ scenarios,” a rule of reasonableness excluding impacts with “a low
probability of occurrence,” and an analysis requiring the “federal action to be the ‘proximate
cause’ of [the] impact” (footnotes omitted)).
187. See infra Part II.A.1–3.
188. Compare N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 139–40, 142 n.10 (3d Cir.
2009) (following Metropolitan Edison), with San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449
F.3d 1016, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing Metropolitan Edison).
189. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1029; see supra Part I.F.
190. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983) (“[T]he
terms ‘environmental effect’ and ‘environmental impact’ . . . [should] be read to include a
requirement of a reasonably close causal relationship between a change in the physical
environment and the effect at issue.” (emphasis added)).
191. See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 139, 142 n.10 (noting that the Ninth Circuit
made no reference to Public Citizen).
192. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767–68 (2004). In Public Citizen, the
FMCSA’s issuance of interim rules concerning the safety regulations for Mexican motor carriers
was the agency action. Id. at 760, 768. The increased volume of Mexican motor carriers in the
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Court held that the Agency’s issuance of regulations was not the cause of the
change in the environment because the Agency lacked the ability to prevent
change; rather, the President was the proximate cause because he alone could
authorize motor-carrier entry.193 Likewise, the NRC’s decision to exclude
potential airborne attacks from NEPA review could not be the proximate cause
of the environmental effects of such an attack because the NRC lacks the
ability to prevent an airborne attack.194 The NRC cannot prevent these types of
airborne attacks because of two intervening causes: the extraordinary act of a
third-party criminal, and some failure on the part of agencies responsible to
prevent terrorism.195 Therefore, applying the proximate-cause test consistent
with Public Citizen, no reasonably close causal relationship existed between
the NRC’s licensing action and the change in the physical environment.196

United States was the damage to the environment. Id. at 761, 768. The environmental
effect—increased pollution due to exhaust—was a purported result of this increased presence of
Mexican trucks. Id.
193. Id. at 770.
194. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 139–40. The NRC does not control the airspace
above the facilities it regulates; rather, Congress and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
hold that responsibility. Id. at 137. Additionally, the NRC has specifically explained its limited
ability to face an airborne threat. Id.
195. Id. at 140. The Third Circuit analogized to the tort principle that a superseding cause
breaks the causal link between a negligent act and a resulting injury. Id. In tort law, a negligent
defendant generally will not be held liable for injury caused by an intervening criminal act. See
id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 142 (1965)). Therefore, by analogy, a criminal act
of terrorism on a nuclear facility would function as a superseding cause, severing any causal link
between the NRC’s licensing action and the impact of the terrorist attack. Id. at 140–41.
However, the Third Circuit acknowledged that there are some situations in which a third-party
criminal act will not be a superseding cause. Id. at 140 (“[A]n actor should anticipate third-party
criminal conduct [in] . . . situations ‘created at a place where persons of peculiar vicious type are
likely to be’ who might yield to the temptation, even though the average individual would not do
so.” (emphasis added) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 cmt. b)). After
considering the 1965 Restatement’s six factors used to determine if an intervening act is a
superseding cause, the Third Circuit concluded that an act of terrorism on a nuclear facility is a
superseding cause. Id. at 140–41 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442).
Two commentators have criticized the Third Circuit’s six-factor analysis. See Amanda
Lopez, Note, NEPA in the Post-9/11 World, 37 ECOLOGY L. Q. 423, 443 (2010); Ben Schifman,
Note, The Limits of NEPA: Consideration of the Impacts of Terrorism in Environmental Impact
Statements for Nuclear Facilities, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 373, 400–01 (2010). Both
commentators argue that the NRC already anticipates or should anticipate that terrorists “might
avail themselves of the opportunity to attack a nuclear power facility.” Schifman, supra, at 400;
see also Lopez, supra, at 443. However, whether the terrorist will take advantage of the
opportunity is not the relevant concern to NEPA; rather, NEPA analysis considers whether—in
light of the NRC’s actions under the AEA and other government actions—the attack will succeed.
See infra Part II.B.2.
196. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 140–41. Critics of a proximate-cause approach to
NEPA argue that proximate cause in tort law is backward-looking regarding liability, rather than
forward-looking as in NEPA; therefore, the tort concept is inapplicable. Hill, supra note 177, at
3048; see also Schifman, supra note 195, at 400–01.
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In addition to ignoring Public Citizen,197 the Ninth Circuit failed to consider
the relevant decisions of the other circuit courts of appeal.198 In a factually
similar case, the Eighth Circuit affirmed an agency’s refusal to reopen the EIS
comment period for consideration of terrorist attacks following September 11th
reasoning that any “increased threat was general in nature and did not bear
specifically on [the project at issue in the case].”199 Additionally, the D.C.
Circuit, citing the Supreme Court’s proximate-cause test in Metropolitan
Edison, stated that the NEPA analysis should not consider actions of “deranged
criminal[s]” when assessing environmental impacts.200 In a similar fashion,
the Second Circuit upheld the Department of Transportation’s refusal to
consider the effects of sabotage on the shipment of large quantities of
radioactive material on highways because “the risks of sabotage were too far
afield for consideration.”201 As demonstrated above, these decisions leave the
Ninth Circuit alone in holding that the environmental impacts of terrorist, or
otherwise criminal actions require consideration under NEPA.

197. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 142 n.10; see San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace
v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1028–31 (9th Cir. 2006) (failing to consider the Public Citizen decision
in its analysis).
198. See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 142–43 (acknowledging other circuit
decisions in which the courts disagreed with the San Luis Obispo holding); PG&E Certiorari
Petition, supra note 135, at 22.
199. Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 543–44 (8th Cir.
2003). The Mid States Coalition petitioners challenged the decision of the Surface Transportation
Board to approve a new rail line and upgrades to existing rail lines through Minnesota and South
Dakota. Id. at 532. The petitioners had requested that the Board reopen comments on the draft
EIS after the comment period had closed but before the Agency’s decision, but the Board
concluded that additional proceedings were not warranted. Id. at 544. In response, one petitioner
contended that the Board had violated NEPA by failing to reopen the commentary period to
account for terrorist attacks in the Board’s EIS. Id. at 543–44.
200. Glass Packaging Inst. v. Regan, 737 F.2d 1083, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Glass
Packaging Institute challenged a decision by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
(ATF) to allow the packaging and sale of liquor in plastic bottles. Id. at 1084. The Glass
Packaging Institute contended that, as a part of the EIS, ATF should have considered potential
criminal acts involving the injection of poison into the plastic bottles. Id. at 1091. The D.C.
Circuit rejected this claim for two reasons. Id. at 1091–92. First, the harmful ingestion of liquor
that has been criminally injected with poison is beyond the scope of an environmental-impact
assessment. Id. at 1091. Second, the criminal act of a third party does not create an obligation to
asses an environmental effect thereof merely because the act was reasonably foreseeable; rather,
the scope of the causal relationship “must be defined by the policies and legislative intent behind
NEPA.” Id. at 1091–92 (citing Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S.
766, 774 n.7 (1983)).
201. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 750 (2d Cir. 1983). The Department
of Transportation adopted a final rule governing the shipment of large quantities of radioactive
material on federal highways, which New York challenged. Id. at 737–38. The Second Circuit,
disagreeing with the district court’s conclusion that the Department should have stated its position
on the possibility of a sabotage or terrorist act, deferred to the Department’s judgment that “the
risks of sabotage were too far afield for consideration.” Id. at 750.

2012]

Terrorism and the National Environmental Policy Act

555

2. Determining the Risk of a Terrorist Attack: Is it Mere Speculation?
In an EIS, the agency is required to evaluate “reasonably foreseeable”
events,202 but “NEPA does not require consideration of remote and speculative
events.”203 The Ninth Circuit purported to apply this standard in San Luis
Obispo.204 The NRC determined that the risk of a terrorist attack, such as
those on September 11th, is unquantifiable and so “[a]ny attempt at
quantification . . . would be highly speculative.”205 As a result, an act of
terrorism is not reasonably foreseeable and warrants no consideration in the
NEPA analysis.206
The Ninth Circuit and other commentators have disagreed with this
argument, contending that the NRC is able to effectively consider an act of
terrorism in an EIS because it has done so in other instances.207 The NRC has
taken significant measures to address nuclear security in other contexts,
including a “top to bottom” review of terrorism threats.208 The Ninth Circuit
found that the NRC could not claim a risk is unquantifiable in one context, and
then, in another, take credit for assessing that risk.209 Furthermore, the Ninth
Circuit asserted that the NRC could take a qualitative approach to terrorism
assessments in an EIS as already done in other contexts, such as for severe
accident assessments.210
202. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(a) (2010) (defining “indirect effects,” which must be considered in
an EIS under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.15(b), as effects that are “reasonably foreseeable”).
203. Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 739 (3d Cir. 1989).
204. See San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1030–31 (9th Cir.
2006). According to the Ninth Circuit, an EIS “need not discuss remote and highly speculative
consequences.” Id. at 1030 (quoting Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017,
1026 (9th Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Third Circuit in New Jersey
analyzed the issue under the proximate-cause test and did not address the whether an act of
terrorism is too remote and speculative. See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 142
(3d Cir. 2009).
205. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 350 (2002); see also N.J. Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot., 561 F.3d at 143 (citing GEIS FOR LICENSE RENEWAL, supra note 137, § 5.3.3.1) (equating
terrorist attacks to sabotage and citing to the NRC’s GEIS, which determined that the risk of
sabotage is unquantifiable and not reasonably expected).
206. See, e.g., Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 351
207. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1031–32 (“Thus, we conclude that precise quantification
of a risk is not necessary to trigger NEPA’s requirements, and even if it were, the NRC has not
established that the risk of a terrorist attack is quantifiable.”); see also Mott, supra note 175, at
352 (explaining that quantifiability is not the sole factor used to assess risk); Schifman, supra
note 195, at 398–99 (identifying other areas in which the NRC exercises control over
nuclear-facility security to address concerns with potential airborne attacks, and arguing that such
control therefore extends to environmental-impact reviews).
208. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1032; see supra Part I.H (describing new licensing
requirements designed to address terrorism concerns, which the NRC imposed in the wake of
September 11th).
209. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1032.
210. Id. at 1031–32. The NRC requires that applicants for reactor licenses perform a
probabilistic risk assessment of severe accidents in the final safety-analysis report. 10 C.F.R.
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In Weinberger, the Supreme Court noted that the first of NEPA’s twin aims
is to require an agency to consider environmental effects during the
decision-making process.211 Expanding on this, the First Circuit in Sierra Club
identified three factors to consider when determining what environmental
impacts are “too speculative to warrant consideration”212: (1) How likely are
the impacts to occur? (2) Can the impacts be described with “sufficient
specificity” to make consideration of the impacts useful? (3) Would the
agency’s failure to consider the impacts now, foreclose the possibility of
considering them later?213 Subsequently, CEQ has modified the likelihood
factor by requiring agencies to consider “impacts which have catastrophic
consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low.”214
The likelihood factor, when coupled with CEQ’s regulations, requires an
environmental risk assessment.215 The Ninth Circuit and other commentators
have noted that the probability of a terrorist attack is significant enough to
warrant agency expenditure of resources on appropriate action to protect
against such an attack.216 However, the Ninth Circuit and these commentators
have failed to consider the effectiveness of these actions.217 For example, the
NRC’s post-September 11th design requirements and security measures have
reduced the probability of a successful terrorist attack on a nuclear facility.218
§ 52.47(a)(27) (2010). A probabilistic risk assessment is a methodology to quantify the risk of a
particular hazard by identifying initiating events that would contribute to the hazard, assigning an
estimate frequency of each initiating event, and stochastically combining the initiating events to
determine a total risk. See NRC: Fact Sheet on Probabilistic Risk Assessment, U.S. NRC, http://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/probabilistic-risk-asses.html (last updated
Feb. 4, 2011). Performing these analyses is a complex task involving event trees, fault trees,
human-reliability analysis, and Monte Carlo statistical methods. Id. However, the Ninth Circuit
observed that the NRC has permitted a qualitative, rather than quantitative, probabilistic
assessment when the quantity of risk is uncertain. San Luis Obispo, 445 F.3d at 1031 (citing
Proposed Policy Settlement on Severe Accidents and Related Views on Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. 16,014, 16,020 (Apr. 13, 1983)).
211. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981).
212. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 878 (1st Cir. 1985).
213. Id.
214. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4) (2009). The regulations governing this section were amended
in 1986, subsequent to the First Circuit decision. National Environmental Policy Act
Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,625–26 (Apr. 25,
1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22).
215. Sierra Club, 769 F.2d at 878; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4). Risk is equal to the probability
of occurrence multiplied by the consequences. See BARRY W. BOEHM, TUTORIAL: SOFTWARE
RISK MANAGEMENT 6 (1989) (providing a detailed explanation of risk analysis).
216. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1029 (9th Cir. 2006); see
Hill, supra note 177, at 3009–11 (describing some of the NRC’s post-September 11th security
measures and arguing for inclusion of terrorist attacks in NEPA analysis).
217. See, e.g., San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1030–31 (describing the NRC’s actions in
response to heightened terrorism concerns, but not the successful effects of such measures).
218. See, e.g., Lopez, supra note 195, at 446 (describing the new measures enacted in the
Energy Policy Act of 2005, as well as the NRC’s increased security requirements).
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Rather than serving as an independent device, the EIS supplements agency
actions in the decision-making process.219 Therefore, the efforts of the NRC
and the other agencies to prevent a successful terrorist attack should inform the
NRC’s, or any agency’s, determination of the likelihood of a potential attack
succeeding when deciding whether to include such an attack in an EIS.
As required by the CEQ regulations, reasonably foreseeable risks cannot be
ruled out on probability alone because even a small risk could have extreme
consequences.220 When considering these consequences, an agency is required
to consider existing “credible scientific evidence.”221 Although there are
conflicting views, scientific evidence generally supports the conclusion that a
breach in reactor containment222 is unlikely to occur as a result of a terrorist
attack, particularly an airplane attack, thus resulting in little environmental
consequence.223 As a result, the overall risk of radioactive release to the
environment (the probability of a successful attack multiplied by the likelihood
of containment breach) is small, which weighs in favor of the argument that a
successful act of terrorism is not reasonably foreseeable.
219. 40 C.F.R. § 1562.4(b) (2010); see also N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132,
139–40 (3d Cir. 2009).
220. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4) (2009).
221. Id.
222. Reactors use “defense in depth” and redundancy systems to prevent the release of
radioactive material into the environment. NUCLEAR ENGINEERING HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at
47. The reactor containment, a hardened building surrounding the reactor and other systems
designed to be leak tight, is one barrier to radioactive release. Id.
223. See BACKGROUNDER: NUCLEAR SECURITY, supra note 10, at 3 (“[T]he NRC initiated a
security and engineering review based on the September 11th events. The review looked at what
might happen if terrorists used an aircraft to attack a nuclear power plant. The NRC also assessed
the potential consequences of other types of terrorist attacks. National experts from Department
of Energy (DOE) laboratories used state-of-the-art experiments and structural and fire analyses to
assist the NRC. While the details are classified, the studies confirm that the plants are robust, and
the likelihood of a radioactive release affecting public health and safety is low.”); see also HOLT
& ANDREWS, supra note 155, at 5. However, the Union of Concerned Scientists, which has been
a proponent of increased actions to protect against air attacks, concluded that a terrorist attack at
the Indian Point power plant in New York would have wide spread and significant consequences.
LYMAN, supra note 11, at 4. Yet, the Nuclear Energy Institute, a nuclear industry group, has
concluded that the impact of an aircraft on any nuclear-power-plant containment type in the
United States would not breach the containment. NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., DETERRING
TERRORISM: AIRCRAFT CRASH IMPACT ANALYSES DEMONSTRATE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT’S
STRUCTURAL STRENGTH 1–4 (2002), available at http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats
/documentlibrary/safetyandsecurity/reports/epriplantstructuralstudy (follow “DOWNLOAD”
hyperlink). For new plants, the NRC and the nuclear industry have both considered design
changes and modifications to resist a plane attack. Westinghouse has modified its principle
reactor design, the AP1000, to resist aircraft penetration by lining the concrete containment
structure with steel plates. HOLT & ANDREWS, supra note 155, at 6. Additionally, the NRC has
issued a rule requiring applicants for new nuclear power plants to perform analysis beyond
design-basis threats and to consider the effects of an impact by a large, commercial aircraft.
Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactors, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,112, 28,112
(June 12, 2009) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 50 & 52).
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The second factor from Sierra Club—whether the impacts can be described
with “sufficient specificity” to make their consideration useful224—lends some
support to the conclusion that a terrorist attack is reasonably foreseeable under
NEPA; however, closer examination reveals just the opposite. The NRC could
perform numerous engineering evaluations to describe a terrorist attack and its
consequences with a high level of specificity.225 However, these evaluations
would not be particularly useful because a terrorist attack could take on a
variety of forms, with each permutation presenting a different set of
consequences.226 These numerous permutations could lead the NRC to expend
significant resources evaluating the credibility and potential consequences of
endless scenarios with sufficient specificity.227 Furthermore, the NRC and
other agencies have already taken action to prevent successful terrorist attacks
against nuclear facilities.228 Although the engineering capability to evaluate
these different attack scenarios exists, the evaluations would not be useful if
the results were merely hypothetical, rather than based on some likelihood of
occurrence.229 When considered in conjunction with the large range of
possible attacks, and the uncertainty associated with the success rate of any
given attack, the second factor supports a finding of not reasonably
foreseeable.
The third factor from Sierra Club also supports the conclusion that a terrorist
attack is not reasonably foreseeable under a NEPA analysis when the NRC is
licensing a nuclear facility.230 Failing to consider terrorist attacks at the time
of licensing does not foreclose the possibility of considering terrorist threats
later.231 In fact, the NRC approach to nuclear security demonstrates the

224. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 878 (1st Cir. 1985).
225. See e.g., supra note 224 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 35, at 90 (describing possible attack
scenarios—such as air attacks, water attacks, shelling the facility from a distance—and their
possible consequences). A cyber attack is another possible scenario. See David E. Sanger, Iran
Fights Malware Attacking Computers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010, at 4 (reporting on the Stuxnet
worm, which is a computer virus aimed solely at industrial computer equipment, such as
equipment used by nuclear facilities).
227. See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing worst-case analysis).
228. See supra Part I.H.
229. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
230. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 878 (1st Cir. 1985) (explaining the third factor as to
whether the agency’s failure to consider the impacts at a certain time will make later
consideration of them irrelevant). In Sierra Club, the federal government, in conjunction with the
State of Maine, decided to build a causeway and seaport. Id. at 870. The court found that failing
to consider the effects of subsequent development of the area when making the decision to build
the causeway would foreclose future consideration of the environmental effects of that
development because after the causeway was built the development would be inevitable. Id. at
879.
231. See, e.g., HOLT & ANDREWS, supra note 155, at 4–6 (discussing how the NRC has
modified its licensing regime in the wake of September 11th).
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Agency’s ability to assess changes after the initial licensing decision.232 The
reactors currently in use were designed before September 11th and not
designed to protect against today’s terrorist threats.233 However, the designbasis-threat regulations were designed to adapt to new threats and are
applicable to both new and existing facilities.234 Therefore, each of Sierra
Club’s three factors supports the conclusion that a terrorist attack on a nuclear
facility and a potential radioactive release to the environment is not reasonably
foreseeable under NEPA.
3. “Worst-Case” Analysis
One commentator has asserted that “the risk of a terrorist attack on a nuclear
power plant is based on numerous feasible scenarios.”235 This illustrates the
challenge that the NRC would be faced with if it had to evaluate a terrorist
attack in its EISs.236 Evaluating the various permutations of possible attack
scenarios ultimately would drive an agency to conduct a worst-case analysis.237
It is impractical for the NRC to expend resources generating multiple
evaluations of conceivable, but highly speculative, hypothetical situations.238
Instead, the NRC would be driven to group the possible permutations into a
few categories; then perform one bounding analysis for each category using
simplified and conservative assumptions. This process is essentially a
worst-case analysis, which is no longer required under NEPA.239
C. The NEPA Process for Sensitive Security Issues
The second aim of NEPA is to provide assurance to the public that an
agency has appropriately considered the impacts on the environment as part of
the decision-making process.240 NEPA analysis is a largely public process.241
232. See id. at 5 (noting the flexibility in the NRC’s response to September 11th in amending
its regulations for obtaining licenses).
233. Id. at 4.
234. See supra Part I.H.
235. Mott, supra note 175, at 352 (using this point to argue that the risk of a terrorist attack
should be considered in an EIS).
236. See supra notes 225–30 and accompanying text.
237. Cf. National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable
Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,621 (Apr. 25, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1502)
(“[O]ne can always conjure up a worse ‘worst case’ by adding an additional variable to a
hypothetical scenario.”).
238. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356 (1988) (citing 51
Fed. Reg. at 15,620).
239. 51 Fed. Reg. at 15,620. When it removed the “worst case analysis” requirement from
NEPA regulations, CEQ stated that the “requirement is an unproductive and ineffective method
of achieving [the original regulation’s goals]; one which can breed endless hypothesis and
speculation.” Id.; see also Robertson, 490 U.S. at 355–56 (recognizing that the “worst case”
regulation was removed).
240. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./ Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981).
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However, this public aspect conflicts with the “need to protect certain sensitive
information.”242 Those advocating inclusion of terrorist attacks in an EIS
argue that this challenge is surmountable and should not be used as a basis for
their exclusion.243 Additionally, the Supreme Court held that a NEPA review
may be required even though public disclosure of the results would be
forbidden by a FOIA exemption, such as the exemption for properly classified
documents.244 Therefore, security considerations alone do not preclude a
NEPA review.245
III. ACTS OF TERRORISM SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED UNDER NEPA
Addressing the problem of terrorism requires a coordinated governmental
effort that approaches security in a comprehensive manner. NEPA is not the
appropriate vehicle for the level of threat assessment and risk management
needed to properly address terrorism.
A. Aspects of NEPA Render It Incapable of Adequately Addressing the Threat
of Terrorism
The NRC should not address acts of terrorism in an EIS for several reasons.
First, it is unnecessary and redundant. The rule-of-reason analysis articulated
by the Supreme Court in Public Citizen246 obviates any need to consider
terrorism in an EIS. Furthermore, the NRC already addresses acts of terrorism
under its statutory obligations in the AEA.247 Repeated analysis in an EIS
would spread existing and limited resources unnecessarily, in opposition to the
Supreme Court’s “manageable line” approach set forth in Metropolitan
Edison.248 Notably, the Ninth Circuit in San Luis Obispo neither addressed
these concerns, nor recognized the controlling precedent of Public Citizen.249
Second, as set forth in Metropolitan Edison, a “reasonably close causal
relationship” between agency action and a potential change in the physical
environment is the relevant standard for determining whether terrorism should
be addressed in an EIS.250 As the Third Circuit demonstrated in New Jersey,

241. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 354 (2002).
242. Id. at 354.
243. See San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1034 (9th Cir. 2006);
Hill, supra note 177, at 3045–46.
244. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 143–46.
245. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1034 (citing Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 143–46).
246. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767–68 (2004).
247. See supra Parts I.A., I.H.
248. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 n.7 (1983); see
also supra Part I.C.1.
249. See supra Part II.A.1–3; see also supra Parts I.C.2, I.F.
250. Metro. Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 774; see also Part II.A.1.
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the relationship between the NRC’s action and the effects of a terrorist attack
do not fit under this standard as a matter of law.251
Finally, even if the Ninth Circuit was correct in finding that the standard in
Metropolitan Edison does not apply to this relationship,252 the NRC’s actions
taken to address terrorist attacks at nuclear facilities, combined with actions of
other federal agencies and local governments, has significantly reduced the
probability of a successful terrorist attack on all facilities.253 Therefore, the
government interaction and the criminal notion of a terrorist attack interrupt
any causal connection between the NRC’s licensing action and make the
efforts of a successful attack “so remote and highly speculative”254 that such
efforts are “not reasonably foreseeable.”255
B. Terrorism Demands a Holistic Approach
Terrorism is not limited to just one agency, or even just to the purview of the
federal government.256 Because of the limited resources at the government’s
disposal, agencies must be efficient in addressing issues within their scope of
authority.257 Agencies must be smart when allocating their funds. Therefore,
resources should be spent in the most effective way possible to prevent
terrorist attacks.258 For example, the NRC requires private security forces at
nuclear facilities to protect against a motorized bomb through various means
such as physical barriers and access controls.259 These are practical and
effective means for stopping this type of attack.260 But an aircraft attack is
different.261 Airport security, secured cockpit doors, and foreign intelligence
are the appropriate means for addressing such attacks.262 Coordination among
governmental entities is required to address terrorism efficiently and
effectively.

251. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 136–43 (3d Cir. 2009).
252. See supra Part I.F.
253. See supra Parts I.H, II.A.2.
254. After the Ninth Circuit determined that the standard in Metropolitan Edison was
inapplicable, the court concluded that “so remote and highly speculative” was the appropriate
standard. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2006).
255. See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 140–41 (describing the intervening events
between the NRC EIS action and a successful terrorist attack).
256. See, e.g., id. at 139 (observing that NRC regulates the security of nuclear facilities while
Congress and the FAA are responsible for securing airspace).
257. See supra Part I.C.1.
258. See supra Part I.C.1.
259. 10 C.F.R. §§ 73.1(a)(1)(iii), 73.1(a)(2)(iii), 73.45 (2010).
260. See HOLT & ANDREWS, supra note 155, at 1.
261. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
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C. Resolution of the Circuit Split
There are three ways to resolve the circuit split regarding the inclusion of
terrorism in an EIS. First, the Supreme Court could address this issue.
Second, Congress could create a specific exception to NEPA. Third, the CEQ
could issue a rule clarifying that assessments of terrorism attacks are not
necessary in an EIS.263
Legislation and regulation are better options than a judicial ruling for a
number of reasons. First, they both directly involve the public, either through
communicating with the public during rulemaking or public comment,
hearings, and lobbying a legislator during legislation. Second, they both set
generally applicable rules rather than deciding a case based on a certain
specific set of facts. Although this Comment has particularly focused on the
actions of the NRC, the problem of addressing terrorism in an EIS is not
unique to the NRC.264 Finally, providing direction through legislation or
guidance to all agencies through regulation would be more efficient than
having individual litigants bring an action against each individual agency, each
of which has a different approach to protecting against terrorism.265

263. Rulemaking has an additional hurdle that legislative action does not have because
rulemaking is likely to be challenged on the same basis as the two principal cases discussed
herein. However, a different result is possible because a CEQ rulemaking is entitled to Chevron
deference. Jeremy Suttenberg et al., Unresolved Conflicts: How Revisiting NEPA Section
102(2)(E) Could Increase Efficiency, Simplify Government, and Save Taxpayers Money, 18
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 156, 180–81 (2010) (“Outside of CEQ, agency interpretations of NEPA are
not entitled to Chevron deference . . . [i]nstead, the court will subject an agency’s
interpretation . . . to de novo review.”). Chevron deference is a three-step process. First, CEQ
must be acting within the authority granted to it by Congress. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243,
255–56 (2006) (noting that Chevron deference is only appropriate where Congress has properly
delegated rulemaking authority to the agency, and that the agency’s challenged interpretation then
relies on that authority). Second, Congress must not have expressly spoken on the matter—
meaning that the statute is silent or ambiguous. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842–43 (1984). Third, the court should defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is a
permissible construction of the statute. Id. CEQ rulemaking would pass all three steps: CEQ is
the agency responsible for overseeing the implementation of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (2006);
NEPA is silent on the issue of terrorism; and an interpretation that NEPA does not require federal
agencies to consider the environmental effects of terrorism would be a permissible reading of the
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Therefore, the CEQ action would be subject to Chevron
deference.
264. For example, the Department of Transportation shares aspects of responsibility for other
portions of our nation’s energy infrastructure that may be targets for a terrorist attack. See, e.g.,
Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004) (involving the issue of whether a
sub-agency of the Department of Transportation was required to asses terrorism in the EIS).
265. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 752 (deciding the case brought about the validity of
their rules governing Mexican motor carriers by an anonymous individual against the Department
of Transportation); Pub. Citizen v. NRC, 583 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing the NRC’s
modifications of a rule governing nuclear power reactors).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although government agencies should address terrorism and its effects
directly, the NEPA process is not the appropriate vehicle to do so. Protecting
against terrorism demands a holistic approach that uses the coordinated efforts
of the federal government and includes all critical infrastructure266 so that
relative risk can be considered and resources can be devoted appropriately to
different potential targets. As a result, terrorism is not suited for a
decision-by-decision analysis as required by the NEPA process. Furthermore,
acts of terrorism are beyond the scope of the NEPA process for three reasons.
First, evaluating terrorism in NEPA is duplicative with the obligations of the
NRC under the AEA; therefore, because it goes beyond the manageable line
the Supreme Court has admonished, terrorism is not required to be assessed by
NEPA. Second, the proximate-cause argument relied on by the Third Circuit
is the appropriate application of Supreme Court precedent. Third, the actions
being taken outside of NEPA by the NRC and other government agencies
reduce the likelihood of occurrence and success to levels that make an act of
terrorism “remote and speculative.” The uncertainty that this circuit split
creates is harmful to the effective operation of government agencies. This split
should be resolved and, in the absence of resolution by the Supreme Court, the
appropriate mechanism to bring about resolution is a public rulemaking
process on the issue by CEQ or legislative action.

266. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 752 (involving the FMCSA, which regulates, inter
alia, motor carriers on federal highways); New York v. NRC, 573 F.3d 916, 917–18 (9th Cir.
2009) (involving the NRC’s modification of its design-basis-threat rule regulating the security of
licensed nuclear facilities).
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